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Abstract We use a large-scale internet experiment to explore how subjects learn
to play against computers that are programmed to follow one of a number of stan-
dard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best
response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error
process. We explore how subjects’ performances depend on their opponents’ learning
algorithm. Furthermore, we test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to
their advantage in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic
teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation
with the notable exception of imitation.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, theories of learning in games have been extensively studied in exper-
iments. The focus of those experiments was primarily the question which learning
theories describe best the average behavior of subjects. It turns out that some very
simply adaptive procedures like reinforcement learning, best response dynamics, or
imitation are fairly successful in describing average learning behavior of subjects in
some games (see, e.g., Erev and Haruvy 2008, for a recent survey).
The focus of the current experiment is different. We are interested in the following
strategic aspects of learning in games. First, how is a player’s success affected by the
way opponents learn? Second, how can the opponent’s learning process be influenced
by the player’s behavior? For example, can it be manipulated to the player’s advantage?
To address those questions, we present here a first—very exploratory—experimental
study. Since we are interested in how subjects respond to certain learning theories, we
need to be able to control the behavior of opponents. The best way to do that is by
letting subjects play against computers programmed with particular learning theories.1
The questions raised in this paper seem to be fairly novel, although the second ques-
tion has received some attention at least in the theoretical literature.2 For example,
Fudenberg and Levine (1998, p. 261) write “A player may attempt to manipulate his
opponent’s learning process and try to ‘teach’ him how to play the game. This issue
has been studied extensively in models of ‘reputation effects’, which typically assume
Nash equilibrium but not in the context of learning theory.” Following Camerer and Ho
(2001) and Camerer et al. (2002) we shall call this aspect of learning “strategic teach-
ing”.3 We believe that this hitherto largely neglected aspect of learning is of immense
importance and deserves further study. As we shall see in this experiment, theories
just based on adaptive processes will not do justice to the manipulation attempts of
subjects.
We consider five learning theories in a Cournot duopoly: best-response (br), ficti-
tious play (fic), imitate-the-best (imi), reinforcement learning (re), and trial & error
(t&e). Some noise is added in order to make the task less obvious. Noise is also a
requirement for some of the theoretical predictions to work as it prevents a learning
process from getting stuck at states which are not stochastically stable.4 The selection
of learning theories is based on the prominence in the literature, convenient applica-
bility to the Cournot duopoly, and sufficient variety of theoretical predictions.
The experiment was conducted as a large scale internet experiment. Internet exper-
iments are still relatively novel (see, e.g., Drehmann et al. 2005, for first experiences).
Arguably, the setting (working at home or in the office at your own PC) is more
1 Subjects are, of course, being told that they play against computers. There is now a large experimental
literature making use of computers to control for some players’ behavior in strategic situation, see Cason
and Sharma (2007) for a recent experiment.
2 See Fudenberg and Levine (1989) and Ellison (1997).
3 Note, however, that we use the term in a broader sense, not necessarily referring to EWA as in Camerer
et al. (2002).
4 See, e.g., Vega-Redondo (1997) for imitate-the-best and Huck et al. (2004a) for trial & error.
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representative of real world decisions than in the usual laboratory experiments. Also,
internet experiments allow to reach a large subject pool at moderate cost.5
With respect to the first question, we find that subjects achieve substantially higher
profits than all of their computer opponents but one. The exception is the imitation
algorithm, for which we show theoretically that it cannot be beaten by more than a
small margin and which in fact performs on average better than its human opponents in
the experiment. The computer opponent that allows for the highest profits for its human
counterparts is the reinforcement learning computer. However, due to the stochastic
nature of reinforcement learning, a lot of luck is needed, and the variances are high.
This leads us to the second question: We find that strategic teaching occurs fre-
quently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable
exception of imitation. Subjects learn quickly how to exploit the best response—and
trial & error—computers, usually by behaving as Stackelberg leader, although some
subjects manage to find more innovative and even more profitable ways.
Two papers are closely related to our work. Shachat and Swarthout (2002) let
subjects play against both human subjects and computers, which are programmed to
follow reinforcement learning or experienced weighted attraction in repeated 2 × 2
games with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. They find that human
play does not significantly vary depending on whether the opponent is a human or
a programmed learning algorithm. In contrast, the learning algorithms respond sys-
tematically to non-Nash behavior of human subjects. Nevertheless, these adjustments
are too small to result in significant payoff gains. Coricelli (2005), on the other hand,
found that human subjects do manage to exploit computer opponents that play a biased
version of fictitious play in repeated 2 × 2 zero-sum games.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Cour-
not game that is the basis for all treatments. In Sect. 3 we introduce the computer
types and the associated learning theories. The experimental design is explained in
Sect. 4, followed by the results in Sect. 5. In Sect. 6 we consider a laboratory treatment
as a robustness check. Section 7 concludes. The instructions for the experiment and
screenshots are shown in the Appendix.
2 The Cournot game
We consider a standard symmetric Cournot duopoly with linear inverse demand func-
tion max{109 − Q, 0} and constant marginal cost, MC = 1. Each player’s quantity
qi , i = 1, 2 is an element of the discrete set of actions {0, 1, . . . , 109, 110}. Player i’s
profit function is given by
π(qi , q−i ) := (max{109 − qi − q−i , 0} − 1) qi . (1)
Table 1 shows outputs and profits for the Nash equilibrium, the competitive out-
come (where p = MC = 1), the collusive outcome, the Stackelberg outcome, and
5 Since internet experiments are relatively novel, we explore some methodological issues of this experiment
in a companion paper by comparing it to various laboratory treatments (see Duersch et al. 2008b).
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Table 1 Prominent outcomes qi q−i πi π−i
Cournot-Nash equilibrium 36 36 1,296 1,296
Symmetric competitive outcome 54 54 0 0
Symmetric collusive outcome 27 27 1,458 1,458
Stackelberg leader outcome 54 27 1,458 729
Stackelberg follower outcome 27 54 729 1,458
Monopoly solution 54 0 2,916 0
the monopoly solution. Subjects play the Cournot duopoly repeatedly for 40 rounds.
Thus, we index the quantity qti by the period t = 1, . . . , 40.
A Cournot duopoly is chosen for this experiment because, based on earlier theo-
retical and experimental contributions, we expected that the behavior of the various
learning theories would differ in interesting ways in a Cournot game. In particu-
lar, there was the conjecture that imitation would behave very differently from the
remaining learning theories. In order to make this conjecture precise, we derive in
this paper a new theoretical result, namely that the imitation algorithm cannot be
beaten by much even by a very sophisticated player. Of course, this result applies
only to a particular class of games that includes the Cournot game but also games like
chicken.6
3 Computer types
Computers were programmed to play according to one of the following decision rules:
Best-response (br), fictitious play (fic), imitate the best (imi), reinforcement learning
(re), or trial & error (t&e). All decision rules except reinforcement learning are deter-
ministic, which would make it too easy for subjects to guess the algorithm (as we
experienced in a pilot study to this project). Therefore, we introduced some amount
of noise for the deterministic processes (see below for details). The action space for
all computer types was {0, 1, . . . , 109}.
All computer types require an exogenously set choice for the first round as they can
only condition on past behavior of subjects. To be able to test whether starting values
matter, we chose different starting values. However, to have enough comparable data,
we restricted the starting values to 35, 40, and 45. Starting quantities were switched
automatically every 50 plays in order to collect approximately the same number of
observations for each starting quantity but subjects were unaware of this rule.
3.1 Best-response (br)
Cournot (1838) himself suggested a myopic adjustment process based on the individ-
ual best-response
6 We thank a referee for this observation.
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qti = arg maxqi π(qi , q
t−1







for t = 2, . . .. Moreover, the parameters are such that if both players use the best-
response process, the process converges to the Nash equilibrium in a finite number of
steps (see, e.g., Monderer and Shapley 1996).
This deterministic process is supplemented by noise in the following way. If the
best response process yields some quantity qti , the computer actually plays a quantity
chosen from a Normal distribution with mean qti and standard deviation 2, rounded
to the next integer in {0, 1, . . . , 109}.7 This implementation of noise is also used for
computer types fictitious play and imitation.
3.2 Fictitious play (fic)
A second decision rule that is studied extensively in the literature is fictitious play (see
Brown 1951; Robinson 1951; Fudenberg and Levine 1998, Chap. 2). A “player” (that
is, in our setting, the computer) who uses fictitious play chooses in each round a myo-
pic best response against the historical frequency of his opponent’s actions (amended
by an initial weight for each action). If we let those initial weights be the same for each
action and each player, w1i (q−i ) = w1, we obtain the following recursive formulation
for the weight player i attaches to his opponent’s action q−i , where 1 is added each
time the opponent chooses q−i .
wti (q−i ) = wt−1i (q−i ) +
{
1 if qt−1−i = q−i
0 if qt−1−i = q−i
for t = 2, . . . Player i assigns probability






to player −i using q−i in period t . Consequently, player i chooses a quantity that
maximizes his expected payoff given the probability assessment over the opponent’s
quantities, i.e.,
qti ∈ arg maxqi
∑
q−i
pti (q−i )π(qi , q−i ). (3)
We simulated the fictitious play processes against itself and some other decision
rules for many different initial weights w1 and ended up choosing w1 = 1/25. Except
for much smaller or much larger initial weights, results of the simulations did not
7 Due to a programming error in the rounding procedure, the noise of computer types br, fic, and imi was
actually slightly biased downwards (by 0.5), which makes the computer player slightly less aggressive. This
does not have any lasting effects for computer types br and fic but has an effect on imi.
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change much. Very high initial weights lead to rather slow adaptation whereas very
small ones resulted in erratic movements. Since our Cournot duopoly is a potential
game, fictitious play converges to the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium (see Monderer
and Shapley 1996).
3.3 Imitate the best (imi)
Imitation has received much attention recently in both theory and experiments (see
e.g., Vega-Redondo 1997; Apesteguia et al. 2007; Schipper 2008). The rule “imitate
the best” simply requires to choose the best action that was observed in the previous







−i ) ≥ π(qt−1−i , qt−1i )
qt−1−i otherwise.
(4)
Vega-Redondo (1997) shows for a symmetric Cournot oligopoly that if all players
follow this decision rule up to a small amount of noise, then the long run distribution
over quantities assigns probability 1 to the competitive outcome (where p = MC) as
the noise vanishes.8 The intuition for this is simple. For all total quantities Q such that
p > 1, the firm with the highest quantity receives the highest profit. When the highest
quantity is imitated by other firms, Q increases. For Q such that p < 1, the firm
with the lowest quantity is being imitated, such that Q decreases. Thus, Q converges
to the competitive quantity. See Huck et al. (1999) and Offerman et al. (2002) for
experimental evidence.
With respect to the current experiment, of particular interest is the question what
happens when only one player imitates the best? The following proposition shows that
imi can essentially not be exploited even by very sophisticated players.9
Proposition 1 Suppose a player knows that his opponent follows the rule imitate the
best (imi) and even knows the opponent’s starting value.
(a) If this player wants to maximize his absolute payoff over 40 rounds, then the
optimal strategy yields an average payoff of 46,374, which is much less than the
profit of 55,068 for his computer opponent imi and also less than the Cournot
profit of 51,840.
(b) If the player wants to maximize his relative payoff (i.e., the difference between
his payoff and his opponent’s payoff), then an optimal strategy yields an average
profit differential of 212.67.
8 Vega-Redondo’s result has been generalized to larger classes of games by Alós-Ferrer and Ania (2005),
Possajennikov (2003), Schipper (2003) and Tanaka (1999).
9 Schipper (2008) shows that if there are both imitators and best-response players in the game, then any
state where imitators are weakly better off than best-response players and where best-response players play
a best-response is absorbing. Moreover, if mistakes are added, then in the long run imitators are strictly
better off than best-response players. The intuition is that if imitators play a sufficiently large quantity,
best–responders become Stackelberg followers.
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Proof See Appendix. unionsq
The implications of the proposition are the following. First, even sophisticated
human players that maximize their long-run profits in a forward looking way against
imi will achieve much lower payoffs than their computer opponent imi. Second, the
total profit of the sophisticated player is much lower than the total profit of the stage
game Cournot-Nash equilibrium over 40 rounds or the profit a Stackelberg leader
could achieve against computer br. Hence, even sophisticated human subjects playing
against imi will typically earn much less than playing against other computer types.
Third, since imi will never lower its quantity q2 as long as q1 +q2 < 108, any mistake
or experimentation that leads to an increase of the human subject’s quantity will result
in a permanent drop of profits. Thus, we should expect to see profits decline over time.
Finally, even subjects that do not care to maximize their absolute profits but instead
aim at beating the computer (i.e., maximize their relative payoff), can only do so by
a very modest margin of 212 (for comparison note that a Stackelberg leader gains a
profit differential against a follower of 40 × 729 = 29,160).
3.4 Reinforcement learning (re)
In a standard model of reinforcement learning by Roth and Erev (1995), an action is
chosen with probability that is proportional to the propensity for this action. Propen-
sities, in turn, are simply the accumulated payoffs from taking this action earlier in
the process.
In games with a large action space such as a Cournot duopoly, it seems unreasonable
to reinforce only that single action that was chosen in a given round. Rather, actions
in the neighborhood should also be reinforced although to a lesser extent depend-
ing on their distance to the original choice. Therefore, we complement the standard
model of reinforcement learning by updating of neighborhoods à la Sarin and Vahid
(2004).
The player starts with the same initial propensity for each quantity, w1i (q). For
t = 2, . . ., propensities are updated by10
wti (q) = max
[
1, wt−1i (q) + β(q, qt−1i )π(qt−1i , qt−1−i )
]
,
where β is the linear Bartlett function
β(q, qt−1i ) := max
{
0,




That is, all actions within five grid points of the chosen action are also reinforced.
10 We imposed a lower bound of 1 on propensities.
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Theoretical results on the convergence properties of reinforcement learning are
scarce.11 Thus most of the analysis is based on simulations. We ran several simu-
lations of reinforcement learning against itself as well as other decision rules while
varying the initial propensities w1i (q). Choosing initial propensity is always a bit arbi-
trary. However, results did not change much when using different initial propensities.
We chose w1i (q) = 78, which minimized the mean squared deviation to the Nash
equilibrium. Since reinforcement learning already is a stochastic process, we did not
add additional noise to the process.
3.5 Trial & error (t&e)
Huck et al. (2004a,b) introduce a very simple trial & error learning process. Players
begin by randomly adjusting their initial quantity either up- or downwards with an
exogenously fixed step size. If this change increases profits, the direction is contin-
ued. If it does not, the direction of adjustment is reversed. We chose a step size of 4.
Formally, players adjust their quantities as follows:
qti := max{0, min{qt−1i + 4st−1i , 109}},
for t = 2, . . . , where
sti :=
{
sign(qti − qt−1i ) × sign(π ti − π t−1i ) if (qti − qt−1i )(π ti − π t−1i ) = 0+1,−1 each with positive probability otherwise. .
On the boundaries of the output grid, we chose a “soft reflecting boundary”. In
particular, when the process reached 109 or 0 twice in subsequent periods, the next
quantity chosen was 109 − 4 or 0 + 4, respectively.
Huck et al. (2004a) show that in Cournot duopoly if players choose the wrong
direction with small but positive probability, then trial & error learning converges in
the long run to a set of outcomes around the collusive outcome. To follow the theoret-
ical setting, the noise for this process was modelled such that the computer chose the
11 Laslier et al. (2001) show that reinforcement learning converges with positive probability to any strict
pure Nash equilibrium in finite two-player strategic games. Similar results were obtained by Ianni (2002).
However, they do not consider reinforcement of neighborhoods as in our case.
123
Rage against the machines 415
opposite direction from that prescribed by the theory with independent probability of
0.2 in each round.12
4 Experimental design
In total, 550 subjects participated in our internet experiment. Subjects played in a
location of their own choice (home, office etc.), and at their own pace. Recruitment
was done by email, internet newsgroups, and a University of Bonn student maga-
zine. Each subject chose a nickname. Incentives were provided by publicly display-
ing a highscore after the experiment (like in computer games). We did not want to
exclude (and implicitly select) subjects by technical means. In order to participate in
our experiment, a standard web browser and a low-speed internet connection were
sufficient.
Subjects could repeat the experiment as often as they desired,13 either immediately
or at some later time. Subjects were encouraged to repeat under the same user name
as before.14 While 550 subject played the first round (“first-timers”), we recorded 500
plays by “repeaters”.
The sequence of events was as follows. After logging in, subjects were matched
to a computer type. The computer type was displayed to subjects via a label (Greek
letters) though subjects were not told how computer types were associated with labels.
In the instructions (see Appendix A) subjects were told the following: “The other firm
is always played by a computer program. The computer uses a fixed algorithm to cal-
culate its output which may depend on a number of things but it cannot observe your
output from the current round before making its decision.”A page with instructions
was displayed to subjects. At any time during the experiment, subjects were able read
the instructions and an example for calculating profits by opening a separate window
on their computer. After reading the instructions, subjects could input their quantity
for the first round. The computer displayed a new window with the results for the
current round including the number of the round, the subject’s quantity, the subject’s
profit, the computer’s quantity as well as the computer’s profit (see Appendix B for
screenshots). Subjects had to acknowledge this information before moving on to the
following round. Upon acknowledgment, a new page appeared with an input field for
the new quantity. This page also showed a table with the entire history of previous
rounds’ quantities and profits for both players.15
12 Trial & error learning can be viewed as a special operationalization of learning direction theory by Selten
and Buchta (1998). This theory assumes that players can judge in which direction better actions can be
found. In the absence of information about demand and cost conditions, one interpretation is that the right
direction can be found by determining which direction was successful last period.
13 One subject actually played a record 31 times.
14 The incentives for doing so were the highscore and the possibility to pick the same computer opponent
as before (subjects logging in under a different name were allocated to a randomly chosen computer). The
latter possibility was only revealed once subjects logged in under the same name.
15 See the working paper version (Duersch et al. 2008a) for an additional treatment, in which subjects were
reminded only of the previous round’s results. The results did not differ significantly.
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Table 2 Mean quantities
Note: Average quantities over
all 40 rounds and all subjects in
a given treatment. The
Cournot-Nash equilibrium
quantity is 36. Standard errors of
means in parentheses
Treatment Subjects’ Computers’
Mean quantities Mean quantities
br 51.99 (0.61) 27.79 (0.30)
t&e 48.96 (0.71) 32.05 (0.49)
fic 46.11 (0.74) 31.94 (0.26)
imi 46.40 (0.91) 48.38 (0.49)
re 47.45 (0.83) 35.71 (0.72)
Total 48.68 (0.34) 33.92 (0.29)
After round 40, subjects were asked to fill in a brief questionnaire (see Appendix)
with information on gender, occupation, country of origin, formal training in game
theory or economic theory, previous participation in online experiments, and the free
format question “Please explain in a few words how you made your decisions”. It
was possible to skip this questionnaire. The highscore was displayed on the following
page. This table contained a ranking among all previous subjects, separately for sub-
jects who were matched against the same computer type and for all subjects. It also
contained the computer’s highscore.
5 Results
To give a first impression of the data, we present in Table 2 mean quantities of subjects
and computers, respectively, averaged over all rounds and subjects. The first thing to
notice is that subjects on average have much higher quantities than computers (48.68
vs. 33.29). This holds for all treatments except for the imitation treatment. Recall that
the Cournot-Nash quantity is 36 (see Table 1). Thus, subjects chose on average quan-
tities that exceeded by far the Cournot quantity and in some cases came close to the
Stackelberg leader output of 54.
5.1 How are profits affected by the opponent’s learning algorithm?
How do subjects’ profits differ with respect to their computer opponents? Figure 1
shows a boxplot, which compactly summarizes the range of subjects’ average profits
per round of first time players and repeaters, respectively. The figure reports those
measures separately for each treatment, i.e., for each computer opponent (br, t&e, fic,
imi, and re). In the boxplot, the boxes denote the interquartile range (ICR) between
75th and 25th percentiles, i.e., 50% of observations are concentrated in this range. The
line in the box denotes the median profit. The length of the whiskers is the min of 1.5
times the ICR and the distance to the most extreme outcome. The dotted line shows
the profit per round in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for comparison.
First time players who are matched against computer types br, t&e, or fic achieve
median profits that are about equal to or slightly less than the Nash equilibrium profit.
Drastically different, however, are profits of subjects who were matched against the
computer types imi and re. Median profits against imi were less than half the profits
against the first three computer types. Even the very best subjects do not reach the Nash
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br t&e fic imi re
computer opponent
Fig. 1 Boxplot of human subjects’ profits against the different computer opponents (left panel first-timers,
right panel repeaters). The boxes denote the interquartile range (ICR) between 75th and 25th percentiles.
The line in the box denotes the median profit. The length of the whiskers is the min of 1.5 times the ICR and
the distance to the most extreme outcome. The dotted line shows the profit in the static Nash equilibrium
equilibrium profit, despite the bias in the noise of this computer type (see Footnote 7).
Profits against computer type re are also substantially lower than against br and fic but
they are higher than against imi.16 The range of profits is highest against this type of
computer. Some subjects achieve very high profits that exceed the Stackelberg leader
or collusive profit (of 1,458).
Median profits of repeaters are generally higher than those of first time players.17
While subjects improve somewhat against computer type imi, median profits are still
by far the lowest of all computer types. Against br, fic, and re subjects achieve higher
median profits than in the Nash equilibrium. Again, the very best subjects played
against t&e and re.
It is also quite instructive to consider average profits over time. Figure 2 shows
average profits of subjects and computers for all 40 periods. Subjects playing against
type br almost immediately gain a substantive edge over the computer and keep their
profits more or less constant somewhere between the Stackelberg leader profit and the
Nash equilibrium profit. The final result against type fic is similar but convergence is
much more gradual. This shows a considerable amount of foresight on the side of our
subjects. When playing against fic (in contrast to br), subjects must be more patient
and forward looking to “teach” the computer into a Stackelberg follower position. The
16 For first-time players, profits against re are lower than against br and fic according to two-sided, non-
parametric Mann–Whitney U tests (see, e.g., Siegel and Castellan 1988) at p < 0.001. For repeaters these
differences are not significant anymore. For both, first-timers and repeaters, profits against imi are lower
than against any other computer type at p < 0.001. A robust rank order test yields the same significance
levels.
17 Profits of those first-timers who we could identify as subsequent repeaters were actually lower in their
first play than those of other first-timers although this difference is not significant. Thus, the increase in
profits shown in Fig. 1 appears to be driven by experience rather than selection of subjects.
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Fig. 2 Time series of profits for subjects and computers for different computer types
fictitious play computer is also the most successful among the computer types as it
stabilizes at a profit of above 1,000. The time series against types t&e and re look
similar, although against the latter subjects do not even manage to achieve the Nash
equilibrium profit on average.18
18 The dip of the computers’ profits in round 2 is due to the high relative weight of the (uniformly distrib-
uted) initial weights in early rounds, while the computer quantity in round 1 is not chosen by the learning
theory, but set to 35, 40 or 45.
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Table 3 Distribution of top
subjects
Note: Pooled over first-timers
and repeaters




Computer type imi yields a totally different picture. In contrast to all others, it is
the only computer type where subjects’ payoffs are lower than those of computers.
Furthermore, subjects average profits are much lower than against other learning algo-
rithms. Finally, the data show that payoffs against imi decrease over time, both for
subjects and for computers. All three results are in line with the theoretical predictions
of Proposition 1.
Table 3 considers the subjects with the highest profits overall. Among the top 100
subjects, there are 48 subjects who played against a computer of type re, 28 who played
against type br, and 24 who played against t&e. The top ten players were almost exclu-
sively playing against type re. This confirms the impression obtained from Fig. 1. The
highest profits can be achieved against type re but a lot of luck is needed for this due
to the stochastic nature of reinforcement learning.
5.2 Human tactics
In this section we shall answer the second question raised in the introduction, namely
how can the opponent’s learning process be influenced by the player’s behavior. One
particularly intriguing question concerns evidence for strategic teaching, i.e., strate-
gic manipulation of the computer types by subjects. Subjects may forgo short-term
gains in order to manipulate the programmed opponent and earn large gains in later
periods.19
Since initially, first-timers did not know the computer type, they may experiment
with different quantities in order to explore the programmed opponent’s responses.
Table 4 reports the fraction of subjects that experiment with quantities. We call a sub-
ject experimenting if the standard deviation of his quantities in the first 10 rounds is
at least twice the standard deviation in the last 30 rounds. Overall at least one quar-
ter of the first-time subjects experiment with quantities in this sense. The fraction
exceeds 40% for fictitious play and trial & error learning. Note that these two are the
“slowest moving” computer types. Table 4 also reports the fraction of repeaters who
experiment. Interestingly, exploration declines when subjects play repeatedly except
for reinforcement learning. So for all learning theories except reinforcement learning,
exploration of first-timers may yield information that is used when the experiment is
repeated. There may be two reasons for why it is different for reinforcement learn-
ing. First, note that reinforcement learning involves a probabilistic choice rule and
19 Collusion as an outcome is theoretically possible only against computer type t&e (Huck et al. 2004b).
However, as data on individual plays reveal, there were no successful examples of collusion between subject
and computer over a prolonged period.
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br Experimentation 25 18
Leadership 20 32
fic Experimentation 41 29
Leadership 14 11
re Experimentation 25 32
Leadership 16 16
imi Experimentation 31 25
Leadership 16 15
t&e Experimentation 40 18
Leadership 16 28
may appear quite erratic to subjects. Therefore it may take more effort to learn about
reinforcement learning than about other computer types. Second, as we have seen in
previous sections, with some luck subjects can earn large profits if reinforcement starts
with low quantities. Subjects’ experimentation in the first 10 rounds may be aimed
exactly at this.
Once subjects have explored and learned about the computer type, they may use
this information to actively manipulate the computer type. Such manipulations may
take on various forms. Probably the most straightforward form of manipulation is
aimed at achieving Stackelberg leadership through aggressive play of large quantities.
Table 4 also reports the fraction of subjects with such leadership behavior. We define
a subject as displaying leadership behavior if he chooses a quantity of least 50 for
at least 36 out of 40 rounds. About 16% of the first-timers display such leadership
behavior. When playing against best response or trial & error learning, this behavior
becomes even more pronounced among repeaters. The increase in leadership behavior
is most remarkable when subjects play against br. Indeed, playing aggressively is a
quite successful manipulation of br. Figure 3a shows quantities of the most successful
subject playing against br and the corresponding computer quantities. This subject
(ranked overall 45th) chose 55 in all 40 periods.20 The computer quickly adjusted to a
neighborhood of the Stackelberg follower quantity with the remaining movement due
to the noise in the computer’s decision rule.
While leadership may be a relatively simple form of strategic manipulation, indi-
vidual data reveal manipulations that can be very sophisticated. We discovered quite
interesting, though not very frequent, patterns that can be seen in Fig. 3b. The subject
who played against best response chose—with only slight variations—the following
cycle of 4 quantities: 108, 70, 54, 42, 108, 70, …Stunningly, this cycle produces an
expected profit per round of 1,520, which exceeds the Stackelberg leader profit.21 By
20 Curiously, none of our subjects chose the exact Stackelberg leader quantity of 54.
21 The only reason the subject in Fig. 3a received an even higher payoff was luck due to favorable noise of
the computer algorithm.
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Fig. 3 a Quantities of subject ranked number 45 and of the br-computer opponent (top panel); b quantities
of subject ranked number 49 and of the br-computer opponent (middle panel); c quantities of top-ranked
subject and his re-computer opponent
flooding the market with a quantity of 108, the subject made sure that the computer
left the market in the next period. But instead of going for the monopoly profit, the
subject accumulated intermediate profits over three periods. This, of course, raises the
question, whether a cycle is optimal and how the optimal cycle looks like. It turns out,
that in this game a cycle of length is four is optimal and, after rounding to integers,
the optimal cycle is 108, 68, 54, 41, which produces an expected profit of 1,522.22
Thus, our subject was within 2 units of the solution for this non-trivial optimization
problem.23
22 See Schipper (2006) for a proof of this claim.
23 The subject played three times against br and left two comments. The first was “tried to trick him”, the
second “tricked him”.
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Fig. 4 Average profits per round of simulated omniscient, myopic player (white bars) versus actual profits
of repeaters (black bars) and first-time subjects (grey bars) when matched against the different computer
types (e.g., re repeat is the average profit of repeaters against computer re, re simulation is average profit of
the omniscient player against re. Note: The omniscient player can perfectly predict the computer’s action
(including noise)
How did the very best subject play? Like all top players, he played against com-
puter type re. Figure 3c reveals that the subject simply got lucky. The reinforcement
algorithm locked in at very low quantities in the range between 10 and 20, and the
subject roughly played a best response to that, which resulted in an average profit of
2,091.
One benchmark to compare the behavior of our subjects to is the maximal profit
an omniscient, myopic player could achieve against the respective learning theory. To
generate this benchmark, we ran simulations pitting our five computer types against
a simulated player who can perfectly forecast the action his computer opponent is
about to take (including the noise) and plays a best response to that, but disregards the
influence of his action on the future behavior of his opponent. As Fig. 4 shows, our
repeater subjects outperform that benchmark against br, re, and t&e. They do worse
than the benchmark against fictitious play but considerably worse only against imitate
the best. Given that the myopic best behavior requires a huge amount of knowledge
about the opponent, which our subjects can not possibly possess since each learning
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theory incorporates a random element, the only way for subjects to match or outper-
form the best myopic benchmark is by playing more sophisticated than myopic—by
influencing future play of the learning theories.
6 The role of incentives: a robustness check
In the main (internet) experiment, the only incentive for subject was the highscore.
It is a justified question whether these incentives are strong enough compared to the
usual financial incentives given in laboratory experiments. To check for this, we con-
ducted a control experiment as a regular laboratory experiment with the usual monetary
incentives. In the lab experiment, 50 subjects played in the Bonn Laboratory for Exper-
imental Economics. The instructions and the computer interface for both settings were
the same up to the incentive structure. Subjects were required to repeat the experiment
once with the same computer type as opponent, i.e., they played two times 40 rounds.
Since there were fewer observations in the lab, we used only a starting value of 40
for the computer types.24 Incentives were provided by paying subjects immediately at
the end of the experiment the sum of profits over all rounds according to an exchange
rate of 9,000 Points to 1 euro. On average, subjects earned 10.17 euro for about half
an hour in the lab.
We do find some significant differences between the two incentive structures. In
the lab experiment, average quantities are significantly lower (MWU-test, p < 0.01)
although average profits do not significantly differ.25 However, the crucial point is
whether the differences across our treatments are robust to changing the incentive
structure. The left panel of Fig. 5 shows average profits of all subjects given their
respective computer opponent. The only significant difference between the lab and
the internet is for computer opponent imi (MWU-test, p < 0.05). More importantly,
all treatment effects are qualitatively the same, independently of the incentive struc-
ture.26 The right panel of Fig. 5 shows the average difference of the subject’s profit
and the computer’s profit. The main result, that human subjects manage to exploit
all of their computer opponents except imi, holds for both incentive structures. The
average profit differential is significantly larger than 0 for computer opponents br,
fic, re, and t&e and for both incentive structures, net and lab.27 The profit differential
against imi is significantly smaller than 0 for both incentive structures at the 1% level.
Furthermore, testing across incentive structures, profit differentials against br, re, and
imi are not significantly different between net and lab. Profit differentials against fic
24 Recall that in the internet experiment, computer algorithms had an equal chance of starting with values
35, 40 or 45.
25 Both results hold for all subjects and for first-timers only. All tests in this Section can also be conducted
as Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests without changing the results. For additional tables with data for each learning
algorithm see the working paper version (Duersch et al. 2008a).
26 Likewise, when we recalculate Tables 3 and 4 by including data from the lab, only very minor changes
occur.
27 According to t-tests at the 1% level with the exception of t&e in lab for which the differential is only
marginally larger at the 10% level. Results for a Wilcoxon test are qualitatively the same.
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Fig. 5 A comparison of the internet experiment (net) and the laboratory (lab). a Left panel Mean profits of
human subjects against their respective computer opponents. b Right panel Mean difference between the
subject’s profit and the computer’s profit. ** Significant difference at the 1% level ; * significant difference
at 5% level, MWU-tests
and t&e are significantly larger in net but, qualitatively, the treatment effects seem to
be robust.
7 Conclusion
In this experiment we let subjects play against computers which were programmed to
follow one out of a set of popular learning theories. The aim was to find out whether
subjects were able to exploit those learning algorithms. We find that there are remark-
able differences in the exploitability of myopic learning algorithms. There are two
insights from this observation: First, while the bulk of traditional learning theories
that have been studied in the literature are myopic in nature, we need more advanced
learning theories that incorporate at least a limited amount of foresight if those learning
theories should also fit subjects engaged in strategic teaching. Many of our subjects
were quite able to exploit the simple myopic learning algorithms. Strategic teaching
is an important phenomenon that needs to be accounted for in the future development
of theory.
Second, from an evolutionary perspective, one desideratum to impose on a realistic
learning theory should be its non-exploitability. If a learning theory can be exploited
by sophisticated subjects to their advantage, then such a learning theory should disap-
pear in the long run. Interestingly, we find that among the learning algorithms studied
in this paper, only imitate-the-best is robust to exploitation. This learning algorithm
is known to lead to a non-Nash equilibrium in the game studied. This observation
poses the following theoretical question left for further research: Does there exist a
simple adaptive learning algorithm that is not exploitable and leads to Nash equilib-
rium?
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof Let the computer be player 2. We first claim that imi will imitate player 1’s
quantity from the previous round if and only if it is closer to 54 than its own quantity
and q1 + q2 = 108. For q1 + q2 = 108, both profits are zero and imi sticks to its own
strategy. For q1 + q2 = 108, we need to show that π(q1, q2) > π(q2, q1) if and only
if |q1 − 54| < |q2 − 54|. For q1 + q2 < 108 or for q1, q2 > 54, the claim follows
because for p > c (p < c) the firm with higher (lower) quantity makes the larger profit
(the smaller loss). It remains to consider the case qi > 54 > q−i but q1 + q2 > 108.
In this case
|qi − 54| = qi − 54 > 54 − q−i = |q−i − 54| .
Since p < c, both firms make losses and since qi > q−i , firm i’s losses are larger,
which proves the claim. Note in particular, that as long as q1 + q2 < 108, imi will
never lower its quantity q2.
(a) Since quantities are strategic substitutes, the above claim implies that for start-
ing values of the computer higher than the Cournot quantity, q12 > 36, player 1 is
best off by not triggering imi to choose higher quantities than q12 . Thus, imi will
continue to play q12 and player 1’s optimal strategy is to play a myopic best reply
q1 ∈ br(q12 ) every period. The resulting profits for the human player over 40 rounds
are maxq1 π(q1, 40) = 46,240 and maxq1 π(q1, 45) = 39,680. The resulting profits
for computer imi are π(40, q1) = 54,440 and π(45, q1) = 57,600.
If q12 = 35, player 1’s optimal strategy is to play qt1 = q12 , for all t = 1, . . . , 39
and q401 ∈ br(q12 ). This results in a profit of 53,202. The imi computer’s profit is
53,165 in this case. Since the three starting values 35, 40, and 45 occur with the same
frequency, the average profit for the player from this optimal strategy is 46,374, while
his computer opponent imi earns 55,068.
(b) Given a starting value q12 of the computer, the player can obtain a positive profit
differential in a given round t if and only if
∣∣qt1 − 54∣∣ < ∣∣qt2 − 54∣∣ . Unless the player
changes his strategy again, this profit differential is eroded in the next period due to the
adjustment of imi to the quantity that yielded the higher profit. The player can close
the gap to 54 in one large step or in several small steps. Due to the linear structure
of the Cournot game, the number of steps does not matter. To see this note that the
profit differential for one step is given by (p − 1)(q1 − q12 ). For starting values of imi
below 54, this expression is maximized by q1 = 54. Now suppose the player takes
two arbitrary steps in rounds 1 and 2 to reach 54 (for all rounds thereafter the profit
differential is zero). The profit differential is then given by
(p1 − 1)(q11 − q12 ) + (p2 − 1)(q21 − q22 ). (5)
Since imi always imitates quantities that are closer to 54, we have that q22 = q11 . Thus
(5) is maximized by q21 = 54 and arbitrary q11 such that q12 ≤ q11 ≤ 54. Consequently,
the profit differential is the same with one or two steps. The same argument holds for
any number of steps towards 54.
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The maximal profit differentials that can be obtained for the three starting values
35, 40, and 45 are therefore 361, 196, and 81, respectively, which yield an average
profit differential of 212.67. unionsq
Appendix B: Instructions
B.1 Introduction page
Welcome to our experiment!
Please take your time to read this short introduction. The experiment lasts for 40
rounds. At the end, there is a high score showing the rankings of all participants.
You represent a firm which produces and sells a certain product. There is one other
firm that produces and sells the same product. You must decide how much to pro-
duce in each round. The capacity of your factory allows you to produce between
0 and 110 units each round. Production costs are 1 per unit. The price you obtain for
each sold unit may vary between 0 and 109 and is determined as follows. The higher
the combined output of you and the other firm, the lower the price. To be precise,
the price falls by 1 for each additional unit supplied. The profit you make per unit
equals the price minus production cost of 1. Note that you make a loss if the price
is 0. Your profit in a given round equals the profit per unit times your output, i.e.,
profit = (price − 1) * Your output. Please look for an example here. At the beginning
of each round, all prior decisions and profits are shown. The other firm is always
played by a computer program. The computer uses a fixed algorithm to calculate its
output which may depend on a number of things but it cannot observe your output
from the current round before making its decision. Your profits from all 40 rounds
will be added up to calculate your high score. There is an overall high score and a
separate one for each type of computer. Please do not use the browser buttons (back,
forward) during the game, and do not click twice on the go button, it may take a short
while.
Choose new quantity
Please choose an integer (whole number) between 0 and 110.
B.2 Example page
The Formula
The profit in each round is calculated according to the following formula:
Profit = (Price − 1) × Your output
The price, in turn, is calculated as follows.
Price = 109 − Combined output
That is, if either you or the computer raises the output by 1, the price falls by 1
for both of you. (but note that the price cannot become negative). And the combined
output is simply:
Combined output = Your output + Computers output
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Example:
Lets say your output is 20, and the computers output is 40. Hence, combined output
is 60 and the price would be 49 (= 109 − 60). Your profit would be (49 − 1) ×
20 = 960. The computers profit would be (49 − 1) × 40 = 1,920. Now assume you
raise your output to 30, while the computer stays at 40. The new price would be 39
(=109−40−30). Your profit would be (39−1)×30 = 1,140. The computers profit
would be (39 − 1) × 40 = 1,520.
To continue, please close this window.
Appendix C: Screenshots
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